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Econometric Accounting of the Australian
Corporate Tax Rates: a Firm Panel Example
Abstract
The paper presents an econometric accounting of the e¤ective corporate
tax rate in Australia for the years 1993 to 1996. The estimation is a panel
of Australian rms that uses a specially gathered nancial data base. Using
xed and random e¤ects, the model species that the statutory tax rate is
estimated as the constant term of the model. An ability to nd an estimated
statutory tax rate that is close to the actual rate suggests a certain condence
in the estimated e¤ects of the others factors a¤ecting the e¤ective tax rate.
The results show importance for interest expenses, depreciation allowances,
debt/asset structures, and the foreign ownership of rms. There is support
for an Australian role as a preferential tax location.
Keywords: E¤ective tax rate, accounting model, panel data, random and
xed e¤ects
JEL: H25, E62
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1 Introduction
The paper presents a model of the e¤ective corporate tax rate that it esti-
mates econometrically using advanced panel techniques. The contribution is
that it presents an exercise that combines an accounting with an economic
approach to studying the determinants of e¤ective corporate taxation. An
accounting model without estimation is unable to weight the importance
of the di¤erent factors that rms actually use in structuring their taxation
strategy. Estimation of an accounting-based model however puts statistical
weights on what actually was important to the rms. The exercise is useful
in that it presents a way to distinguish between what corporate form the tax
law allows and what corporate form manifests given the tax law. This can
be a guide to analysis of tax features when tax law reform is being consid-
ered, or as a guide to the sensitivity of revenue yield from di¤erent tax law
provisions.
Starting with an accounting identity of corporate taxes in Australia, hy-
potheses are formulated and robust estimation results are presented. The
estimation follows previous work such as Gropp (1997) in using a consistent
normalization factor across its current period variables, and in focusing on
depreciation, interest, revenue, and the debt to asset ratio. This e¤ective tax
rate (ETR) estimation nds signicance for these variables as well as for rm
ownership and subsidiary structure. The paper therefore illustrates how an
accounting-econometric approach can work, suggests that the approach may
warrant further application, and yields results of interest from a tax policy
perspective.
1
Figure 1: International Statutory Rates of Corporation Tax
2 Australian Corporate Tax
Figure 1 illustrates the level of the statutory corporate tax rate in Australia
for the years under study, as they compare to a set of Western countries.
Australias rate was lower than Japan in three of the four years, and lower
than the US half of the years. Relative to the UK and New Zealand, Aus-
tralian rates were equal or higher.
In terms of how the tax base is dened, Table 1 illustrates that taxable
(corporate) income is gross prot, plus capital gains, minus deductions.
Allowable interest expenses are limited to those resulting from at most a
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Table 1: Taxable Income
Total prot/loss
plus
capital gains and other add back items
minus
allowable deductions
equals
taxable income !
apply tax rates
! gross tax payable
minus
credits and rebates
equals
total liability
minus
tax already paid
equals
tax to pay/refund
Source: Deutsch, Gates, Gibson, Hanley, Payne, and Plummer (1996).
three to one debt to equity ratio. Credits (and rebates) directly reduce
the tax payable, whereas deductions reduce taxable income before the tax
rate is applied. Carry-loss forwards are the most important tax credit. The
investment tax creditin Australia, unlike that which has existed in the US,
is actually a deduction rather than a credit. It allows (from 1992 to 2002) for
an additional 10% depreciation allowance, by the Income Tax Assessment Act
1936 (sections 82AAAA to 82AQ), applying to certain projects costing more
than $50 million (Australian) during 1992 to 2002. R&D also is largely taken
as a deduction, with rms having an aggregate R&D expense of greater than
$20,000 (Australian) being entitled to an enhanced deduction (concession)
of 150%, reduced to 125% in 1996. There is an alternative option to take
a tax credit (a tax o¤set) based on R&D, this being less used. Other
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di¤erences in deductions are project or industry specic, such as immediate
expensing for mining; and other credits exist such as for paid foreign tax.
Capital gains on a companys assets are added to taxable income. Note
that di¤erences can arise between taxable income and accounting income, in
particular, because of timing and permanent di¤erences (Wise, Needles,
Anderson, and Caldwell 1998).
Firms in Australia report their nancial information through tax entities.
A tax entity by denition either carries out a distinct function for the rm or
operates within a specic geographic or industrial market. Firms can have
as many tax entities as they wish, and tax entities generally have various
sets of inter-entity transactions with each other. Subsidiaries typically tend
to be tax entities.
3 The Data
Accounting data from a rms nancial balance sheet, known as nancial
data, is used in the study. The data is part of the IBIS Enterprise Database,
a panel data set. It contains information on an annual basis for medium
to large rms (no small rms) in Australia from 1979 to the present. A
balanced panel consisting of 377 rms was constructed from the database for
the years 1993 to 1996.1 To be included in the panel, rms must have non-
missing nancial information for all years, on all of the variables required to
calculate the dependent and independent variables used in the subsequent
1A balancedpanel is one in which all rms are observed for the same number of years.
Use of such a panel aids estimation although dependent on the nature of the rms not
included and the processes which deteremines non-inclusion, this potentially introduces a
selection bias.
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econometric analysis. The relatively short length of the panel reduces the
chance of survivorship bias a¤ecting the results.
Excluded from the panel are nancial rms, government rms, trusts,
associations and cooperatives. The e¤ective tax rate is dened as the ratio
of income tax expense to prot before tax and can take on values greater
than zero and less than one; other values are excluded.2 Manufacturing
rms account for 45 percent of all rms included in the panel, whilst just
over 22 percent are involved in wholesale trade; 42 percent of all rm the
rms are listed while 55 percent are Australian owned. Thus a large percent
are foreign owned.
Table 2 compares the median e¤ective tax rate for rms included in the
panel, with the statutory rate for each year. The median e¤ective tax rate
for IBIS rms is close to the statutory rate for 1994, 1995, and 1996, and
2.5 percentage points less than the statutory rate in 1993. Table 3 provides
summary statistics on selected nancial variables.
Table 2: E¤ective v Statutory Tax Rates
Year Median E¤ective Tax Rate Statutory Rate of Taxation
1993 36.44% 39%
1994 33.28% 33%
1995 32.95% 33%
1996 35.56% 36%
2See Gropp (1997) for a study that includes such outliers.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Observations
Deviation
ETR = T= 0.339 0.122 0.001 0.974 1,508
Revenue= 41.40 123.8 0.944 1,888 1,508
Depreciation= 0.221 0.367 0.001 7.335 1,508
Interest= 0.141 0.288 0.000 3.102 1,508
Debt/Assets 0.558 0.271 0.089 5.448 1,508
Subsidiaries 1.633 1.243 0.000 5.595 1,508
Foreign 0.448 0.498 0.000 1.000 1,508
SD(Revenue) 0.074 0.183 0.000 1.525 1,508
Size 11.74 1.500 7.809 17.377 1,508
4 Accounting Specication
Consider the denition of taxable income given in Table 1. Denoting this by
yit; for each rm i and year t, it is equal to revenue (Rit) minus costs (Cit)
minus interest expense (iit) plus capital gains (git) and minus deductions
(dit), yielding
yit = Rit   Cit   iit + git   dit: (1)
Table 1 also indicates that the taxes dueare equal to the statutory rate of
corporation tax (SRCT)  t in period t factored by reported before-tax prots
it, and subtracting credits and rebates (c
p
it). Denoting the tax due by Tit;
this gives that
Tit =  tit  
PX
p=1
cpit; (2)
where there are p = 1; : : : ; P possible tax credits and rebates (cpit  0;8p; i and t).
Equation (2) can be normalized by dividing through by it; giving
Tit
it
=  t   1
it
PX
p=1
cpit: (3)
Equation (3) denes a so-called e¤ective tax rate. Such an ERT is
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typically thought of as the normalized tax expense (Wickerson, Reddan, and
Khan 2000), where the normalization makes the ETR an averagetax rate.
Here the data is of a nancial nature that makes available before-tax prot,
so this is uses as the normalizing variable.3
4.1 Testable Hypotheses
The denition of the ETR as taxes normalized by it, as in equation (3), o¤ers
an approach for studying taxes that has testable features. First, using the
identity nature of the structure, the estimated constant should be equal to  t;
the SRCT; and this is a testable hypothesis. The second set of hypotheses
comes from the di¤erence between the theoretical taxable income yit and
the reported before-tax prot it. The factors that comprise the theoretical
taxable income, Rit; Cit; iit; git; dit; arise as candidates that can be focused
on in the transition from taxable income to reported before-tax prots. For
example if revenues are higher in the actual taxable income than in the
reported prot, then it would be expected that inclusion of revenues in the
estimation of the e¤ective tax rate would lower the tax rate. This is because
in e¤ect the additional revenues dilutethe average amount of taxes paid.
Similarly, if the interest expenses in the actual income are greater than those
expensed in the reported prot, then such interest expenses act to raise costs,
lower the income and raise the e¤ective tax rate. This logic would also give
a positive relation between deductions and the estimated e¤ective tax rate.
With respect to capital gains, one inuence is how much is held in equity
that needs to be reinvested outside of the rm, thereby generating capital
3See Plesko (1999) for a study of marginal versus average tax rates; and see Harris and
Feeny (2003) for a di¤erent normalization as based on tax data.
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gains. Such gains would be positive on average, since they would hover
around a return of at least the positive risk-free interest rate. An increase
in leverage through greater debt conceivably would tend to lower the equity
investments, so that a higher debt to equity ratio can be viewed as lead-
ing to less capital gains. With this view, the debt/equity (D=E), or the
debt/asset, structure, would negatively a¤ect the theoretical taxable income
and so positively a¤ect the taxes as normalized by reported prot.4
The testable hypotheses thus far can be summarized as
@(Tit=it)=@Rit < 0; (4)
@(Tit=it)=@iit > 0; (5)
@(Tit=it)=@dit > 0; (6)
@(Tit=it)=@(D=E)it > 0: (7)
Other factors may a¤ect the e¤ective amount of the credits that are ac-
tually taken or the other components of income. Here factors concerning in-
dustrial structure may a¤ect the e¤ective tax. These factors include whether
they are foreign owned and how many subsidiaries they operate, the size of
rms, their ownership and holding structure. For example, for foreign owner-
ship, it is emphasized that some 45% of the rms are foreign owned and that
Australias average corporate tax rate is lower than some of its major trading
partners, such as the US and Japan for more than half of the years under
study. The nding of a positive e¤ect of foreign ownership on the e¤ective
tax rate indicates possible "tax haven" use of Australian incorporation. As
? explains, rms located in higher tax countries can use foreign ownership
4See Gropp (1997) and ? for related discussion of the debt/equity structure.
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within a lower tax country to transfer income towards the lower tax location,
while transfering deductions towards the higher tax country. This would
tend to make the tax rate higher than that of a typical domestic rm, lead-
ing to a positive e¤ect of foreign ownership. Subsidiaries on the other hand
provide the means for the transfer of income and of deductions, as well as for
di¤erential pricing on intangible assets, and in themselves can allow a rm
to lesson its tax burden, suggesting a negative e¤ect of subsidiary numbers
on the e¤ective tax rate.
On the basis of equations (??) to (??), and the other e¤ects described
above, the following econometric model is specied:
Tit=it = t + x
0
it + i + uit; (8)
where t is a year-specic constant; xit is a vector of nancial variables that
are observed rm characteristics;  is a coe¢ cient vector; i are time
independent unobserved e¤ects(included to allow for any unobserved rm
heterogeneity); and uit is a white noise disturbance term. The testable
hypotheses of equation (8) are that t equals the SRCT in the given year; or
t =  t; (9)
and that the  coe¢ cients are as predicted.
4.2 Variables Entering the Model
Variables in the xit vector include three current income variables: revenue,
interest payments, and depreciation deductions, each normalized by it:Here
the interest and depreciation variables are factored by the statutory tax rate;
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this is to capture additional weight given to such deductions as the tax rate
changes over the years of the sample. An additional expense-type variable
that is included is normalized R&D expenses; this does not end up factoring
signicantly into the econometric results. The debt to asset ratio is included
as in Gropp (1997). Other variables in xit are whether the rm is foreign
owned, through a (0; 1) dummy, and the number of subsidiaries, counting
both domestic and foreign ones owned by a rm. The latter is dened as the
log of one plus the number reported in 1995; this natural log specication
yields a more preferred model interms of t and statistical signicance. Also
the initial model includes the standard deviation of revenue, to capture a role
in carry-forward losses, and the size of the rm; however both of these are
found to be statistically insignicant across specications and the results are
not reported below. Mark felt better because of the insignicance of size.
5 Econometric Methodology
Observed divergences in measured ETRs generally depend on observed rm
characteristics. It is possible to separately control for all these observed
characteristics by entering them as explanatory variables in the regression
equations. There are also unobserved rm characteristics, typically known
as individual or unobserved e¤ects, that can further explain divergences in
ETRs across rms. Unobserved e¤ects tend to capture signicant omitted or
unmeasured variables, such as elements of rm-specic tax and management
strategies.
A panel data set, in comparison to a strictly cross-section or time-series
approach, facilitates conditioning on unobserved individual rm heterogene-
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ity by allowing for the simultaneous conditioning on observed and unobserved
rm characteristics (see, for example, Hsiao 1985, Hsiao 1986, Mátyás and
Sevestre 1996). The panel set also facilitates the testing of the relationship
between the time varying constant and the actual statutory corporate tax
rate.5
5.1 Fixed versus Random E¤ects
Two basic approaches are common for panel estimation: xed and random
e¤ects (FE and RE). The former treats the individual e¤ects as xed pa-
rameters that require estimation, the latter as independent random draw-
ings from a particular distribution. The Hausman (1978) test helps deter-
mine which approach may be preferable. It tests the extent of the cor-
relation between the unobserved e¤ects and the explanatory variables (see
Mundlak 1978, Hsiao 1985, Hsiao 1986). If signicant correlations exist, then
a FE approach is consistent while a RE approach yields biased and inconsis-
tent parameter estimates. If such correlation does not exist, then both are
consistent but a RE approach is more e¢ cient. A RE approach also allows the
identication of the e¤ects of time-invariant variables, which a FE approach
precludes. If a statistically signicant di¤erence is found between these two
estimators, then this is evidence in favour of the xed e¤ects approach.
Formally, the test statistic is
H =

^FE   ^RE
0 h
Avar

^FE

  Avar

^RE
i 1 
^FE   ^RE

 2M ;
5We are grateful to a referees suggestion that it would be possible to allow response
parameters to vary both over time and across industries, although this would entail a loss
of degrees of freedom and smaller e¤ective sample sizes. This approach is left to future
research.
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where ^RE; Avar

^RE

and ^FE Avar

^FE

are respectively, the RE and
FE parameter vector and asymptotic covariance matrices; M is the order of
these matrices, this being the number of time-varying parameters that can
be identied within the FE approach.
Note, that for the FE specications, time-invariant variables need to be
excluded. Here that means that the FE estimation excludes the following
variables while the RE specications include them in the initial specication:
standard deviation of revenue; overseas income; the number of subsidiaries;
foreign ownership; publicly listed/non-listed; and industry dummies.6 Fur-
thermore, as the constant is split into N separate components, an exhaustive
set of dummy variables cannot be included. For this reason, one of the time
dummies is removed (1996), and the coe¢ cients on the remaining ones are
interpreted as di¤erences from that of the omitted one (of course, identical
results would be obtained by including all dummies and excluding the con-
stant term). Thus, from Table 2, the expectation is of a coe¢ cient on the
1994 and 1995 dummies to equal  0:06 (i.e., 0:39   0:33) and on the 1995
one to equal  0:03 (0:39  0:36).
5.2 Hausman and Taylor RE Approach
A further econometric procedure is to try to model the correlation, following
Hausman and Taylor (1981), if the Hausman test suggests that it is evident.
In this way it is still possible to obtain consistent RE parameter estimates
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Consider the generic
6In essence their e¤ects are absorbed into the i.
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model of
yit = w
0
it + i + t + uit; (10)
where wit contains both time varying variables, xit, and time invariant
ones, fi. Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest decomposing wit into wit =
(w01it;w
0
2it)
0, where w1it is a subset of wit that is independent of the un-
observed e¤ect. GMM estimation can then be based on the orthogonality
conditions
E (z0iti) = 0;
where zit is based upon w1it. Using the same partitions as for wit, the
Hausman and Taylor (HT ) (Hausman and Taylor 1981) estimator uses zi =
(f 01i;x
0
i)
0. The t of equation (8) are still treated as xed constants (and as
such, approximate business cycle e¤ects). In the results below w2it = Rit.
The Hausman and Taylor (1981) RE estimation can be further checked
for the validity of its instruments by performing the Sargan (1958) test.
6 Results
Table 4 presents estimation results from both the FE, in the rst and second
columns, and RE approach, in the third and fourth columns. For both the
FE and RE approaches, both the unrestricted results and the results with
the time dummy restrictions imposed are reported.
In all cases the Hausman test statistic quite clearly rejects the null-
hypothesis of E (i jxit ) = 0, thereby rendering standard RE estimates bi-
ased and inconsistent. These standard results are not reported. Instead the
correlation is specically accounted for and the results of the consistent RE
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(HT) GMM estimators are the RE results presented in Table 4.
For the unrestricted FE model, explanatory power is reasonable, at over
30%, and all variables are signicant at 5% size, except the interest payments
and the debt to assets ratio which are signicant at 10% size. For the null
hypothesis regarding no xed unobserved e¤ects, that is i = 0 for all i; the
F test signicantly rejects the null hypothesis.7
One of the testable hypotheses, from equation (9) in Section 4, is that the
time dummies should be equal to the SRCT. With this restriction imposed
in the second and fourth columns of Table 4, the estimation is of the ETR
minus the SRCT. This implies that the testable hypothesis is that the yearly
constant should equal the rate in 1993 minus the rate in the particular year.
The results show that the time dummies are individually strongly signicant
and close to their expected values ( 0:04 as compared to  0:06; and  0:03
as compared to  0:03). A t test clearly accepts the null hypothesis of sig-
nicance for 1996, but this test indicates marginal signicance for 1994 and
1995. Jointly, the F statistic marginally rejects the null hypothesis with a
p value of 0.041 (compared to 0.05). While the time dummy restrictions are
marginally not accepted, the estimated parameter coe¢ cients are nonetheless
notably constant across the unrestricted and restricted FE specications.
The restricted and unrestricted consistent RE (HT) GMM estimates yield
results closely similar to the FE specications; and the results easily pass
the Sargan (1958) test for over-identifying restrictions. And the RE results
allow for other variables to show signicance, in particular the number of
7An anonymous referee has pointed out that an intertesting line of future research
would be to allow both the mean and variance functions to be a function of observed
characteristics.
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subsidiaries and the foreign ownership dummy variable.
The other testable hypotheses concern the comparative statics of equa-
tions (??) to (??) in Section 4. These suggest that: the e¤ect of revenue
on ETRs should be negative and that of interest and deductions positive.
Across all estimations, the e¤ect of normalized revenue is indeed, signicantly
negative, and of a remarkably consistent magnitude. Normalized interest ex-
penses exert a consistently positive e¤ect, ranging from 0.0345 to 0.0485,
although this e¤ect appears to be relatively imprecisely estimated in the
FE approaches. And normalized depreciation, an allowable deduction, has
the predicted positive sign and is strongly signicant across specications,
with a range of 0.042 to 0.050. The debt to assets ratio shows a marginally
signicant and positive e¤ect.
In the RE specications, where it is possible to identify the e¤ects of
time-invariant variables, there is strong evidence that rms with a greater
number of subsidiaries have increased scope for reducing their ETRs. The
evidence also suggests that foreign owned rms have ETRs which are some
two-and-a-half percentage points higher than their domestically owned coun-
terparts. Note also that time-invariant dummy control variables for each of
the 14 industry groups in the sample are also included; these are of varying
signicance and the results not reported (the only statistically signicant
industry dummies were those associated with Construction and Wholesale
Trade, both of which were positive).8
In summary, higher rm ETRs are associated with higher normalized
depreciation and interest payments, higher debt to assets ratios, and foreign
8Full results are available from the authors on request.
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ownership. Lower rm ETRs are associated with higher normalized revenue
ratios and a larger number of subsidiaries. Except for the debt to asset ratio,
these results are very robust across specications.
7 Discussion
The normalization factor in the denition of the ETR typically is some mea-
sure of pre-tax income. Gupta and Newberry (1997) use income after inter-
est and depreciation expenses are subtracted; Mills, Erickson, and Maydew
(1998) use income before interest expenses are subtracted; and Gropp (1997)
uses sales which is before any interest expenses or deductions are subtracted.
Since this papers ETR has interest payments and depreciation already taken
out of the prot, its normalization factor is most similar to that of Gupta
and Newberry (1997). The importance of which divisor is used is in the
comparative statics for the variables entering the econometric estimation of
the ETR. The comparative statics in this paper of the interest payments and
depreciation are of the same expected sign as in Gupta and Newberry (1997),
of the opposite sign to that of Gropp (1997), and the same sign for the inter-
est payments in Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998), but the opposite sign
for the depreciation expenses as that in Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998).
So for example the signicance of depreciation with a negative coe¢ cient
sign contrasts with the results found above of signicance with a positive
sign, but nonetheless are consistent with each other because of the di¤erent
normalization factor.
And as in Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998), Gupta and Newberry
(1997), and Gropp (1997), and there is evidence of the debt to asset ratio
16
Table 4: Fixed and Random E¤ects Regression Results
Random Random
Fixed E¤ects: Fixed E¤ects: E¤ects, HT: E¤ects, HT:
Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Restricted
D94 -0.0363 - -0.0359 -
(0.007) (0.007)
D95 -0.0366 - -0.0364 -
(0.007) (0.007)
D96 -0.0253 - -0.0264 -
(0.007) (0.007)
Revenue= -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deprec.= 0.0446 0.0420 0.0504 0.0480
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)
Interest= 0.0419 0.0345 0.0485 0.0427
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Debt/Assets 0.0374 0.0333 0.0233 0.0219
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
No. of subsid. - - -0.0107 -0.0107
(0.004) (0.004)
Foreign 1 - - 0.0267 0.0264
(0.009) (0.009)
Constant - - 0.3395 -0.0355
(0.017) (0.016)
Industry e¤ects no no yes yes
R
2
0.339 0.320 -
Hausman 0.008 0.000
F   test (i) ; p 0.000 0.000
F   test (t) ; p 0.041
Sargan; p 0.30 0.26
NT 1,508
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signicant at 5% size, two-sided test. Signicant at 10%
size, two-sided test. Reported test statistics are p values.
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a¤ecting the ETRs. While Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) and Gropp
(1997) nd this to signicantly negative in e¤ect, the results above show
a marginally signicant positive e¤ect. The positive sign of the debt to
asset ratio may be because Australia limits allowable interest deductions so
as to not encourage too much leveraging. Also like most previous studies
there is no e¤ect from research and development. Firm size was found to be
insignicant, as in Gupta and Newberry (1997) for example.
Also as in Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) foreign ownership has a
signicant positive e¤ect on the ETR. Further, there is the very robustly
negative e¤ect of the number of subsidiaries, suggesting as in Rego (2002),
additional scope for lowering taxes.
Methodologically, previous work appears not to have focused on the link
between the constant term and the statutory rate, as this paper makes exact
through its choice of the normalization factor in dening the ETR. For ex-
ample in Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998), the constant term is reported
to vary between 42 and 54 for a data set for 1991 of US rms. The advantage
of the time dummies reported in Table 4 is that they give a further check on
the results by showing whether the constant is close to the statutory rate as
it should be. This provides a check for robustness of the models results that
is as much a testable hypothesis as the comparative statics.
The above results, in terms of their comparability to the literature and
their internal consistency and robustness, suggest a certain condence with
which to view its results. Perhaps the main nding is the signicance of
interest payments and the marginal signicance of the debt-asset ratio. This
is consistent with the explanation that rms in Australia are able to decrease
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their tax burden through the use of debt. The stronger signicance in the
US for the debt to asset ratio than is found in this study may be because
of the limits on interest deductions in Australia and the previously existing
double taxation of dividend income in the US.
Another nding is the signicance of the use of depreciation deductions.
This result may be related to other ndings of a strong, consistent, signi-
cance of the e¤ect of the number of subsidiaries and of signicance of foreign
ownership, in lowering the e¤ective tax rate. These results may reect a
practice that was known as double dipping of deductions. This can in-
volve the use of subsidiaries in order to articially increase the number of
arms length transactions and so enable the corporate entity to take the
same deduction more that once. Foreign rms facing high tax rates in their
home countries may have been attracted by the ability to engage in such
practices with low detection probability of using subsidiaries to lower taxes.
This suggests that there may have been elements of a tax haven status for
Australia, due to these practices.
8 Conclusion
The paper presents and estimates an accounting-based model of Australian
e¤ective tax rates using panel techniques. The results indicate which factors
are used relatively more to lower e¤ective taxes during the period under
study. One set of the signicant factors points to tax inducements to use debt.
Another set of factors indicates incentives through the use of deductions that
are coupled with an increased use of subsidiaries, and foreign ownership. The
model estimated the statutory rate rather closely. This is interesting in that
19
it then allows condence in the reported results as to which factors a¤ect the
e¤ective tax rate with more sensitivity. A model that estimates the statutory
rate correctly is not a trivial exercise. We suggest that this feature makes the
range of the point estimates of the other factors in the estimated model much
more precise than the typical e¤ective tax estimations that do not include
the ability to identify the statutory rate during the period under study.
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